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Hilary J. Allen
Professor of Law
American University Washington College of Law
Chairman Brown, Ranking Member Toomey, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing. My name is Hilary Allen, and I am
a Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law. I teach courses in
corporate law and financial regulation, and my research focuses on financial stability regulation.
I have authored several law review articles about fintech and financial stability, and I have also
written a book, Driverless Finance: Fintech’s Impact on Financial Stability, that explores the
threats that crypto and other fintech innovations pose for our financial system. Much of my
testimony is drawn from this book.
Prior to entering academia, I spent seven years working in the financial services groups of
prominent law firms in London, Sydney and New York. In 2010, I worked with the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, which was appointed by Congress to study the causes of the financial
crisis of 2007-2008.
I am not testifying on behalf of the Washington College of Law or any other institution;
the views expressed here are entirely my own.
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1. Executive Summary
The rise of crypto poses very real risks for financial stability, which I have explored at
length in research that I would be happy to share with the Committee. 1 In considering its response
to crypto, I submit that Congress’s most important goal should be to ensure that crypto does not
cause a financial crisis. Proponents of crypto often cite the industry’s potential to create jobs and
improve financial inclusion, but financial crises destroy jobs and exacerbate inequality – including
for people who never invested in crypto in the first place.
A “stablecoin” is a relatively new form of crypto asset. Stablecoins try to avoid the
volatility associated with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin by pegging their value to the US Dollar (or
some other fiat currency). In November of this year, the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets released a report on stablecoins (the “PWG Report”) that identified a number of risks
associated with stablecoins, and made three recommendations for addressing those risks. The
PWG Report’s first recommendation reads as follows:
To address risks to stablecoin users and guard against stablecoin runs, legislation should require
stablecoin issuers to be insured depository institutions, which are subject to appropriate supervision
and regulation, at the depository institution and the holding company level. 2

In this statement, I will set out why I share the PWG’s general concerns about crypto and
financial stability, but disagree with this specific recommendation. In short, stablecoins are not
really being used to make payments for real-world goods and services. Instead, the primary use of
stablecoins is to support the DeFi ecosystem. DeFi is a type of shadow banking system with
fragilities that could – if DeFi reaches significant scale – disrupt our real economy. If lawmakers
and regulators treat stablecoins as regulated banking products, that will lend legitimacy to and
inspire confidence in stablecoins in a way that is likely to turbocharge the growth of DeFi. While
stablecoins do have structural fragilities that may make them vulnerable to runs, the incidence and
costs of stablecoin runs can be addressed by other policies that are less likely to encourage the
growth of DeFi.
At the conclusion of this statement, I will summarize some of the policy options available
to Congress in responding to stablecoins. These policy options range from an outright ban on
stablecoins, through a licensing regime for stablecoins, to a multifaceted approach that uses aspects
of securities law, antitrust, financial stability regulation, and banking law to respond to stablecoins’
risks. While any regulation will inevitably create some barriers to innovation, this is a necessary
trade-off when dealing with money and finance. Use cases for stablecoins and DeFi are often
explained with analogies to other digital services – “send money as easily as sending a
photograph”, or “send money just like sending an email” – but these analogies underestimate the
stakes involved. Because money and finance are the lifeblood of our economy, finance has always
been highly regulated in a way that Kodak’s provision of photographs, and FedEx’s delivery of
couriered letters, never were.
See, for example, Driverless Finance, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 157 (2020); Payments Failure, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 453
(2021); DRIVERLESS FINANCE: FINTECH’S IMPACT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, Oxford University Press
(2021).
2
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, REPORT ON STABLECOINS, 2 (November 2021).
1
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2. Introduction
Today’s hearing is about stablecoins, how they work, how they are used, and their
associated risks. A stablecoin is a new type of digital asset that is designed to have a value that is
more stable than cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, which are notoriously volatile (as a result, Bitcoin
has never been useful as money or as a payments mechanism, even though it remains a popular
investment). There are different ways that the creators of stablecoins seek to stabilize their value.
The most widely-used stablecoins are backed by a reserve of real-world assets. This asset reserve
is intended to inspire confidence in stablecoin holders that they will be able to redeem their
stablecoin at any time at a rate that is pegged to the US Dollar (or some other fiat currency). There
are also algorithmic stablecoins which rely on computer programs to adjust the supply of the
stablecoins to keep the value stable in the face of demand. 3 Algorithmic stablecoins have not yet
experienced significant uptake and so they are not the focus of my testimony (although they should
still be on regulators’ radar). The focus of my statement is on stablecoins backed by reserves, and
how they are being used. Importantly, these stablecoins are not currently being used to pay for
real-world goods and services in any meaningful way. Instead, their primary use is in the
“decentralized finance” or “DeFi” ecosystem. 4 I will explain DeFi in more detail in Section 4; for
now, it suffices to say that DeFi creates digital versions of existing financial services like loans.
There are many different types of risks associated with stablecoins, and the DeFi ecosystem
in which they are primarily deployed. There are risks for investors, whose investments may be
vulnerable to fraud, hacks, and glitches; these risks are best addressed by the SEC and CFTC.
Then there are risks that stablecoins could thwart public policy objectives, if they are used for
money laundering or to avoid tax obligations or sanctions – FinCEN, the IRS, and OFAC are
pursuing these issues. This statement, however, will focus on the risks that stablecoins and DeFi
pose for financial stability. I will therefore start by elaborating on what “financial stability” is,
and why financial stability regulation is important.
Financial stability regulation aims to prevent or mitigate financial crises, and so it must
ensure that the financial system is robust enough to absorb future shocks. While some people have
already forgotten the cost of the financial crisis of 2008, for others, the trauma of losing jobs and
homes is still with them. Furthermore, the wealth disparities exacerbated by the 2008 crisis persist:
for most middle-class families, their net worth in 2017 remained lower than it had been in 2007. 5
These disparities were even more pronounced for middle class African American and Hispanic

On algorithmic stablecoins, see Ryan Clements, Built to Fail: The Inherent Fragility of Algorithmic Stablecoins.
11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 131 (2021) (available at
http://www.wakeforestlawreview.com/2021/10/built-to-fail-the-inherent-fragility-of-algorithmic-stablecoins/).
4
“At the time of publication of this report, stablecoins are predominantly used in the United States
to facilitate trading, lending, and borrowing of other digital assets.” PWG Report, supra Note 2 at 8. See also the
Bank for International Settlements finding that “The growth of stablecoins has been exponential since mid-2020,
when DeFi activities started to take off.” Sirio Aramonte et al., DeFi Risks and the Decentralization Illusion, BIS
QUARTERLY REVIEW, 25 (Dec. 2021).
5
Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the Middle Class Dream Under a Benz, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financial-crisis.html.
3
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families. 6 In short, the harm of the 2008 crisis fell disproportionately on the most vulnerable
members of society. While supporters of crypto regularly cite its ability to create jobs and promote
financial inclusion, a crypto-inspired financial crisis would destroy these, and more. 7
To be clear, financial stability regulation does not aim to eliminate all risks from the
financial system. Instead, the focus of financial stability regulation is on eliminating systemic risks
that could compromise the ability of financial institutions and markets to perform the risk
management, capital intermediation and payments processing functions necessary for broader
economic growth. 8 In short, the endgame of financial stability regulation is sustainable economic
growth, and ensuring the stability of financial markets and institutions is a means to that end. In
the context of stablecoins and DeFi, this means that financial stability regulation should focus on
protecting everyone who could be harmed by the impact of stablecoins and DeFi on our broader
economy – especially those have chosen not to invest in stablecoins or DeFi, but could nonetheless
be harmed by fallout from a crypto market failure.
There is significant uncertainty about how the markets for stablecoins, DeFi, and other
crypto applications will develop. One possible response when faced with uncertainty is to wait
and see what will happen. However, given the potential harm that crypto could cause for the
broader economy, “wait and see” is not good policy. It is therefore commendable that the PWG
has proactively engaged with the risks that stablecoins might pose for financial stability, and that
Congress is proactively contemplating legislation on this issue. However, in my view, the PWG’s
recommendation that Congress enact legislation requiring “stablecoin issuers to be insured
depository institutions” reflects an approach that is too microprudential in nature.
“Microprudential” regulation describes regulation that focuses on the stability of individual
institutions, on the assumption that if an institution is stable, the financial system as a whole will
benefit. 9 The PWG Report proceeds from the view that as long as there’s no run on an individual
stablecoin, then that will benefit financial stability. An important lesson from the financial crisis
of 2008, though, is that financial stability regulation should be “macroprudential” in orientation,
meaning that we should think through the systemic consequences of regulatory decisions 10 – for
example, that microprudential regulation of stablecoins could fuel the growth of destabilizing
DeFi. Macroprudential regulation also requires collaboration among regulators overseeing
different parts of the financial system, with different perspectives on “how different developments
fit together and where the unseen risks might be hidden.” 11 In my statement today, I will highlight
6

Id.
A recent research paper found that “inequality rises following recessions and that rapid credit growth in the run up
to a downturn exacerbates that effect…These links between inequality, credit and downturns are particularly
significant for recessions associated with financial crises.” Jonathan Bridges et al., Credit, Crises and Inequality,
Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 949 (Nov. 2021) (available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/working-paper/2021/credit-crises-andinequality.pdf?la=en&hash=9FC00E0CEA234D1E2C7C34A589A64183294F8FD6).
8
For further discussion of financial stability as a regulatory goal, see Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial
Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1087, 1098 et seq. (2015).
9
For a discussion of macroprudential and microprudential approaches to regulation, see Armour et al.,
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) 416-18.
10
Id.
11
Martin Hellwig, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy, 20 (Aug. 2015) (available at
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2015_10online.pdf).
7
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the dangers inherent in taking too microprudential an approach to regulating stablecoins, and
suggest alternative policy responses that are informed by securities law, antitrust, and financial
stability regulation, as well as banking regulation.
3. Stablecoins and financial stability
The PWG Report considers a number of risks associated with stablecoins, including the
potential for runs on stablecoins. Put simply, a “run” is a self-fulfilling prophecy that arises when
the holders of a seemingly safe asset start to lose confidence that they will be able to withdraw or
redeem that asset at the expected value when they need to. Fearing the worst, they seek to withdraw
or redeem the asset early – which means that the issuer of the purportedly safe asset has to sell off
assets in order to raise enough cash to satisfy the withdrawal/redemption requests. Because the
issuer has to sell quickly, assets are often sold at a discount, which depresses the price of the
issuer’s portfolio of assets and may ultimately drive the issuer into insolvency.
The paradigmatic example of this is a bank run, which occurs when panicking bank
depositors seek to withdraw all of their funds from a bank, forcing that bank (which has invested
the depositors’ funds in long-term assets like loans) to start selling assets at a discount to raise the
funds necessary to meet withdrawal requests. If the bank’s assets shrink so much – as a result of
these discounted fire sales – that the bank’s liabilities outnumber its assets, the bank will fail, and
then it will be unable to perform its usual functions of managing risk, intermediating capital, and
facilitating payments for its customers. Furthermore, the discounted fire sales will not only affect
the bank experiencing the run; they will also affect the market price of the assets that are sold,
which (in a vicious cycle) can threaten the solvency of other institutions that have invested in
similar assets.
In short, runs can cause financial stability problems in two ways: they can deprive the
economy of capital intermediation services on which it relies, and they can ignite fire sales that
drive down the prices of financial assets in a way that drags down other institutions and markets.
As the PWG report and others have observed, asset-backed stablecoins may be vulnerable to runs
because they purport to be redeemable against a fiat currency at a fixed value. 12 If something
were to shake confidence in a stablecoin (as the PWG report identifies, this ‘something’ could
range from a hack to a problem with the reserve assets), 13 then holders might come to doubt that
the stablecoin could retain a stable value against their preferred fiat currency. We could then
expect holders to redeem their stablecoins for fiat currency, forcing the issuer of the stablecoin to
start liquidating the reserve of assets backing the stablecoin, depressing the market value of those
assets, and incapacitating the stablecoin as a means of transacting.
Because of this potential for a run on stablecoins, the PWG Report has recommended that
stablecoins should be treated more like bank deposits and brought within the sphere of banking
regulation. 14 However, in my view, this recommendation misses some key context. Stablecoins
PWG Report, supra Note 2 at 2.
Id. at 12.
14
The report recommends that “legislation should require stablecoin issuers to be insured depository institutions,
which are subject to appropriate supervision and regulation, at the depository institution and the holding company
level.” Id. at 2.
12
13
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differ from deposits in two important ways: (i) the expectations of the parties using them are
different; and (ii) they play different roles in intermediating capital. Because of these differences,
stablecoins should not be brought within the perimeter of banking regulation (at least, not now –
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) and the Office of Financial Research (“OFR”)
should monitor stablecoins for changes in expectations and usage). Regulating stablecoins like
bank deposits will lend them implicit government backing – and with it, confidence and legitimacy
far beyond what stablecoin issuers could generate on their own. 15 Inspiring this type of confidence
in the stability of stablecoins may counterproductively make runs more likely. Furthermore,
legitimized stablecoins will turbocharge the growth of the DeFi (which relies upon stablecoins to
facilitate “fund transfers across platforms and between users”). 16
Expectations surrounding stablecoins
Runs happen when people lose confidence that a particular asset (like a dollar in a deposit
account) will continue to remain accessible at the expected value. This “confidence” aspect of
runs means that runs are unlikely to occur if the people holding an asset never expected it to have
a stable value in the first place. Right now, stablecoins are not being used for payments for real
world goods and services in any meaningful way, and so the people using them do not need them
to maintain a stable value. The recent exponential growth in stablecoin usage has been driven by
people who have purchased stablecoins to speculate in the DeFi markets, 17 suggesting that they do
not care whether their stablecoins will maintain a consistent value. 18 Investor protection regulation
can help tamp down on any limited expectations of stability that do exist, by preventing stablecoin
issuers from advertising their stablecoins as being more stable than they really are, and by
mandating disclosure of the assets in the reserve.
If stablecoins start to become widely used as payments mechanisms for real-world goods
and services, then expectations will shift, and runs will be more likely. The FSOC and the OFR
should monitor the stablecoin market for such a shift. However, (with some caveats I will discuss
shortly) this seems unlikely to happen in the near term. Payments mechanisms benefit from
network effects, meaning that they become more useful as more people and businesses use them.
Stablecoins therefore have a “chicken and egg” problem when it comes to paying for real world
goods and services: they need to develop a critical mass of merchants and users in order to become
useful enough to attract more merchants and users. Before merchants and users are willing to start
embracing stablecoins in this way, stablecoin issuers will have to address concerns about the ability
of distributed ledger technology to process payments on a large scale. Changes in the size and
usage of a payment system often create problems, and it will be particularly challenging for
decentralized distributed ledger to respond to these changes. 19 If there is nobody “in charge” of
The PWG report recommends that “with respect to stablecoin issuers, legislation should provide for supervision
on a consolidated basis; prudential standards; and, potentially, access to appropriate components of the federal safety
net.” Id. at 16.
16
Aramonte, supra Note 4 at 24.
17
See Note 4.
18
As one reporter observed about the stablecoin Tether, “It wasn’t that they trusted Tether, I realized. It was that
they needed Tether to trade and were making too much money using it to dig too deeply. “It could be way shakier,
and I wouldn’t care,” said Dan Matuszewski, co-founder of CMS Holdings LLC, a cryptocurrency investment firm.”
Zeke Faux, Has Anyone Seen Tether’s Billions, BLOOMBERG’S BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 7, 2021).
19
Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 453, 494 (2021)
15
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the ledger on which the stablecoins are used, no fix can take effect unless and until it is adopted
by the majority of the nodes that control that ledger. If majority approval cannot be achieved, the
gridlock can be addressed by a “hard fork” that splits the distributed ledger in two, but given the
network effects of payments systems, hard forks can be a very problematic response to governance
problems.
While stablecoins face major hurdles to becoming a viable payments mechanism, there are
two obvious scenarios in which these hurdles could be overcome more quickly. One is for
lawmakers to follow the PWG’s recommendation to regulate stablecoins like bank deposits, which
would lend stablecoins greater credibility as a payments mechanism and attract merchants and
users. It is perhaps telling that Jeffrey Allaire (the CEO of Circle, issuer of the USDC stablecoin)
has welcomed this type of banking regulation for stablecoins. 20 In my view, this approach would
be unwise – if the government wishes to promote better and faster payments frameworks for
underserved consumers, there are simpler technological solutions to explore that don’t require an
inherently fragile asset like the stablecoin running on a distributed ledger with complex governance
issues (complexity is itself a source of financial instability, and simpler solutions are less likely to
cause problems). 21 Simpler technological solutions will also avoid the environmental costs of
crypto mining. 22
The second way in which a stablecoin could quickly become a widely-used payments
system is if it is launched by a firm that already has a well-established network of users. Most
pressingly, large tech firms already have large networks of users that they could encourage to adopt
any stablecoin they issue. If a tech giant introduced a stablecoin, it could quickly become an
important payments system that becomes critical to the real-world economy (particularly if the
tech firm is willing to use a permissioned distributed ledger that will allow it to easily make
changes to the underlying distributed ledger as its scale of usage changes). People would expect
such a stablecoin to have a stable value, and in this sense, Meta/Facebook’s Diem could pose a
real threat to financial stability. That does not mean, though, that all stablecoins should be
regulated like bank deposits. Instead, the problems related to Diem (and Meta/Facebook’s other
financial projects) should be dealt with directly – as should any other attempt by a tech giant to
provide payments services. This may involve using antitrust law; a complementary approach
would be to use the FSOC’s designation power under Section 113 of Dodd-Frank to designate the
tech giant in question as a systemically important financial institution and subject it to supervision
by the Federal Reserve. Congress could also consider strengthening existing legislation that
20
“But I would say at the highest level, the proposal that dollar stablecoin issuers in the US financial system should
be regulated as banks at the federal level by the Federal Reserve is something that we think represents significant
progress in the growth of this industry.” Circle CEO discusses stablecoin regulation and the bank charter process,
YAHOO NEWS (Nov. 9, 2021)
(available at https://news.yahoo.com/circle-ceo-discusses-stablecoin-regulation-213747962.html).
21
Allen, supra Note 19 at 464 et seq.
22
“According to Marion Laboure, a Deutsche Bank analyst, mining one bitcoin consumes a larger carbon footprint
than nearly two billion Visa transactions. Another incredible stat: an individual bitcoin transaction couldpower the
average U.S. household for 61 days. Adding in the energy consumption of Ethereum, and the two major
cryptocurrencies would rank 15th in the world, nearly equivalent to Mexico.” Steve Goldstein, Here’s how many
Visa transactions can be completed using the energy to mine one bitcoin, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 10, 2021).
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prevents commercial firms from accepting deposits so that commercial firms are prohibited from
accepting deposits and from offering payments services.
The Role of Stablecoins in Intermediating Capital
When considering the problems associated with runs on stablecoins, it’s important not to
lose sight of why runs are a problem. Runs are not intrinsically bad, but they do become a problem
when they interfere with the capital intermediation on which the broader economy depends (either
by igniting fire sales that drag down the prices of assets held by other institutions and markets, or
by disabling a capital-intermediating service for which there are no ready substitutes). For
example, bank runs are a problem because they prevent banks from extending the credit that
individuals and businesses rely upon for growth. In the worst case, runs can generalize into a
broad-scale bank panic at multiple institutions, causing a widespread collapse in lending. Deposit
insurance was adopted in 1934 to prevent this kind of panic and protect the flow of credit,
notwithstanding valid objections from economists about moral hazard (in this context, “moral
hazard” means that deposit insurance gives banks incentives to engage in riskier behavior in order
to multiply their profits in good times, knowing that there is a government safety net that will
absorb the losses in bad times). 23
The moral hazard associated with deposit insurance was ultimately deemed a price worth
paying to keep banks stable and funds flowing through them to the broader economy. But the
value proposition for stablecoins is much less clear: what economic growth do they propel? And
what moral hazard would government backing for stablecoins create? Right now, stablecoins are
primarily being used to facilitate DeFi, and so the issue of whether we’re worried about
stablecoins’ continuing ability to intermediate capital will depend on our conclusions about the
utility of DeFi, and whether or not DeFi deserves implicit government support. These issues will
be addressed in the next Section.
The remining concern about stablecoins, from a financial stability perspective, is whether
run-inspired fire sales will have systemic consequences. This will depend on what assets are in
stablecoins’ reserves. The PWG Report observes that “[b]ased on information available,
stablecoins differ in the riskiness of their reserve assets, with some stablecoin arrangements
reportedly holding virtually all reserve assets in deposits at insured depository institutions or in
U.S. Treasury bills, and others reportedly holding riskier reserve assets, including commercial
paper, corporate and municipal bonds, and other digital assets.” 24 It is possible that mass
withdrawals by stablecoins from insured deposit accounts could trigger runs on the institutions
that provide those deposit acccounts, but that doesn’t mean that stablecoins need to be brought
inside the perimeter of banking regulation. This possibility could be dealt with by prudential
Moral hazard is the “tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the
risk that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk to an insurance company.” RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998). Lovett expressed the
application of moral hazard in the banking context as follows: “If governments and modern nations
do not allow most banks to [fail], how can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be
disciplined and avoid unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or simply poor assetliability management)?” William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based
Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1365 (1989).
24
PWG Report, supra Note 2 at 4.
23
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regulation of existing insured depository institutions: they could be prohibited from accepting
deposits from stablecoin issuers on the grounds that it is an unsafe and unsound practice (there are
already banking regulations that limit acceptance of other volatile deposits, like brokered
deposits). 25
To the extent that stablecoins invest in other assets types like U.S Treasuries, commercial
paper, corporate and municipal bonds, and other digital assets, the impact of stablecoin runs will
depend on the size of the stablecoin reserve. This is another argument for why Congress and
regulators should not adopt policies that encourage the growth of stablecoins (and should take
measures to keep tech giants out of the stablecoin business). If a stablecoin were to gain significant
traction, then fire sales of its reserve assets would obviously be of significant concern, but if
stablecoins remain modestly sized, then any fire sales will have limited impact on broader asset
markets. Interestingly, the reserves of Tether, which currently has by far the largest market value
of any stablecoin, may not actually be as big as expected. As one recent report put it: “[e]xactly
how Tether is backed, or if it’s truly backed at all, has always been a mystery. For years a persistent
group of critics has argued that, despite the company’s assurances, Tether Holdings doesn’t have
enough assets to maintain the 1-to-1 exchange rate, meaning its coin is essentially a fraud.” 26 If
true, this would be highly problematic for investors in Tether, but it would also limit the systemic
impact of any fire sale of Tether’s reserve assets – because there wouldn’t be so many of them. A
run on Tether could, however, be disastrous for DeFi investors, as tens of billions of dollars of
Tether are locked into DeFi protocols. 27
4.

DeFi and financial stability

DeFi, like any new and evolving business model or technology, is hard to pin down with a
precise definition. Right now, the term is used to describe any simulacrum of traditional financial
services performed using blockchain technology (relying in particular on smart contracts and
stablecoins). 28 It can sometimes be hard to disentangle DeFi’s aspirations from its realities. The
term “decentralized finance” speaks to an aspiration – the hope that blockchain technology can be
used to deliver financial services “without centralized intermediaries or institutions.”29 The
expansion of DeFi is sometimes described as the foundation of “web3”, an idealized vision for an
internet that would run on a distributed ledger and therefore avoid the concentrated power of tech
giants like Meta/Facebook and Google. In reality, though, distributed ledger technology is not as
decentralized as claimed. 30

“The OCC does…discourage brokered deposits because of their high volatility and cost, and banks may bay a
higher FDIC deposit insurance premium for such items” Richard Scott Carnell et al., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, 118 (2021).
26
Faux, supra Note 18.
27
Aramonte, suprat Note 4 at 24.
28
The Wharton Blockchain and Digital Asset Project, DEFI BEYOND THE HYPE: THE EMERGING WORLD
OF DECENTRALIZED FINANCE, 2-3 (May 2021) (available at https://wifpr.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/DeFi-Beyond-the-Hype.pdf).
29
Id. at 2.
30
See Angela Walch, Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems, in CRYPTO
ASSETS: LEGAL AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (ed. Chris Brummer) (2019).
25
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Recent research from the Bank for International Settlements has observed that there is “a
“decentralisation illusion” in DeFi due to the inescapable need for centralised governance and the
tendency of blockchain consensus mechanisms to concentrate power.” 31 There have been many
illustrations of the lack of real decentralization in the cryptoverse. 32 One recent example involves
BadgerDAO, which paused all of its smart contracts upon receiving reports of unauthorized
withdrawals 33 – if decentralization lived up to the hype, there should be no person who could
choose to pause the operation of these smart contracts. In addition to individuals who can control
the governance of DeFi apps, many of the investors driving the growth of DeFi are institutional
players, often engaging in transactions worth $10 million or more of cryptocurrency. 34 More
generally, DeFi relies heavily on centralized crypto services (including stablecoins), which in turn
rely on traditional financial services (like banks and fiat currencies). 35 DeFi is therefore not
particularly decentralized, but using the term “decentralized” to describe these services serves a
marketing purpose, and may also be intended to discourage regulation (if policymakers believe the
decentralization hype, they may be misled into thinking that there are no intermediaries to regulate,
notwithstanding that DeFi relies in part on the regulated financial system, wallets and exchanges
are obvious candidates for regulation, and software developers and miners could also be regulated.
Furthermore, just as some regulations and fiduciary duties are applied to significant shareholders
of a corporation, concentrated owners of tokens could also be regulated).
In reality, DeFi’s defining attribute is the technology it relies on, rather than
decentralization. As already stated, DeFi relies on blockchain technology. Stablecoins are
essential to DeFi’s operation, as are smart contracts. A “smart contract” is simply a type of
computer program that is designed to be self-executing and self-enforcing. These programs
establish certain rights and obligations associated with tokens that are hosted on a distributed
ledger, and execute on the distributed ledger (although they can be programmed to consult outside
data sources, which are referred to as “oracles”, before executing). The crypto industry’s vision is
that smart contracts, stablecoins, and distributed ledgers will be used in concert to provide new
versions of “payments, lending, trading, investments, insurance, and asset management”
services, 36 but it is still unclear who will use these services. A recent article in The Economist put
it this way: “The problem is that all this fancy financial engineering has, as yet, no “real” economy
to service. Instead it underpins an incorporeal casino: most of those using DeFi do so to facilitate
or leverage their bets on one of many speculative tokens.” 37 If stablecoins are primarily used in

Aramonte, supra Note 4 at 22.
For examples of actions within the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain systems that suggest centralized control, see
Walch, supra Note 30.
33
“Badger has received reports of unauthorized withdrawals of user funds. As Badger engineers investigate this, all
smart contracts have been paused to prevent further withdrawals. Our investigation is ongoing and we will release
further information as soon as possible”, https://twitter.com/BadgerDAO/status/1466263899498377218 (Dec 1,
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DeFi, and DeFi is an “incorporeal casino”, then treating stablecoins like regulated deposits will
provide implicit government backing to that casino, encouraging its growth.
DeFi Growth
A recent report from the BIS described DeFi as largely self-referential, and concluded that
“[g]iven this self-contained nature, the potential for DeFi-driven disruptions in the broader
financial system and the real economy seems limited for now.” 38 If Tether were to fail right now,
for example, that would cause real problems for the DeFi ecosystem that relies upon it, but because
DeFi still remains largely disconnected from both real-world economic applications and the
established financial system, there would be limited pressure on the government to bail it out.
However, as DeFi grows, the possibilities for something to go wrong, and for that something to
impact the broader economy, increase.
Before the rise of crypto, the supply of new types of financial assets was always
constrained—if only a little bit— because assets had to have some kind of connection to some
kind of real-world economic good or service. Now, assets can be created out of thin air by anyone
with computer programming knowledge, and an unconstrained supply of financial assets means
more opportunities for asset bubbles to grow, and more assets to be dumped during fire sales. More
assets also means more trading transactions which means more contractual relationships between
counterparties that can transmit shocks through the system. Market practices requiring DeFi
transactions to be overcollateralized with stablecoins could theoretically put some limits on the
growth of DeFi, but when stablecoins are used as collateral for loans, the proceeds of those loans
are often used as collateral for other loans, which can then be used as collateral for further loans,
and so on. 39 This is multiplying the amount of leverage in the DeFi ecosystem, and the use of
derivatives is also increasing the amount of leverage. 40 As the 2008 crisis amply demonstrated,
increased use of leverage makes a system more fragile both by inflating asset bubbles on the
upswing, and by causing fire sales on the downswing (if someone buys an asset with mostly
borrowed money, then if the price of that asset falls, they will have to sell either that asset or some
other asset in order to raise money to repay the loan).
DeFi could also grow as traditional financial institutions become increasingly interested in
investing in, and offering, crypto. 41 The head of JPMorgan’s blockchain team, for example, said
earlier this year that “[w]e are keeping a very close eye on the DeFi evolution.” 42 And the interest
goes both ways, with some members of the crypto industry welcoming a relationship with
traditional finance: the CEO of Circle recently said that “crypto needs to be integrated with the
traditional financial system, creating “a hybrid model.” 43 Regulated financial institutions could
make huge profits by offering DeFi versions of their traditional products and services (in the past,
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40
Id.
41
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financial institutions have had significant financial success in offering new versions of existing
financial products that are exciting, but not much better at discharging their functions than previous
versions). 44 Now that unlimited crypto assets can be created through computer programming, DeFi
provides enormous opportunities for profit that may prove too seductive for the established
financial industry to ignore. However, because the real economy relies upon the established
financial industry for credit and other services, the government may feel compelled to bail out
DeFi if it becomes integrated with the traditional financial system.
There are a number of avenues through which the financial industry’s ventures into DeFi
could cause problems for the traditional financial system, and ultimately the broader economy.
First, financial institutions might make large, leveraged investments in DeFi and other crypto
products. If the value of those products were to fall precipitously (for example, because of a hack),
then the institutions invested in them would see their overall asset portfolios shrink, and could
even experience a run. Either eventuality could have severe real-world consequences if it shuts
down the availability of credit for individuals and small businesses, or ignites fire sales of unrelated
asset classes. Furthermore, runs and other financial panics tend to be worse if there isn’t much
information available about the assets involved, or if that information exists but is impossible to
understand. Most investors (including established financial institutions) are used to reviewing
balance sheets and written disclosures to assess investments, not computer code. While it’s
possible for written disclosures to describe how smart contracts will operate, one study found that
the written disclosure documents provided to crypto investors can be highly inconsistent with how
the code of the relevant smart contracts actually functions. 45 This lack of clarity may exacerbate
the problems associated with financial institutions investing in crypto.
Financial institutions might also be inclined to launch their own stablecoins (JPMorgan has
already done so with its JPMCoin, although JPMCoin runs on JPMorgan’s proprietary ledger
rather than on a decentralized ledger). 46 If bank-issued stablecoins could be used in the DeFi
ecosystem, than all the concerns raised in Section 3 about lending implicit government support to
DeFi would be realized. There are also monetary policy and safety and soundness concerns
associated with bank-issued stablecoins: a bank like JPMorgan has always been able to profit by
making US dollar loans to borrowers, but regulations (most importantly reserve and capital
requirements) ultimately limit the amount of loans that banks can make. In addition, banks have
no right to create US dollars for their own spending—that right belongs solely to the central bank.
JPMorgan could create JPMCoins for its own spending, though, and because JPMCoins are not
subject to reserve and capital requirements, JPMorgan could also theoretically make unlimited
loans in JPMCoins.
Disenchantment with the existing financial system has spurred interest in DeFi, and that
disenchantment is understandable and often justified. However, we should be keenly aware that
if there is money to be made in any substitute financial system, established financial intermediaries
will seek to find a way in. Congress should therefore consider steps to keep regulated depository
institutions and their affiliates separate from DeFi. One measure that would contribute to this goal
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would be to prevent these institutions from investing in DeFi or any other crypto; another would
be to prevent these institutions from issuing any stablecoin that operates on a decentralized ledger.
We should also be keenly aware, though, that even without the involvement of established
financial intermediaries, DeFi will tend towards centralization and concentration, and that it suffers
from many of the same problems as traditional finance – along with some new ones.
Speed and rigidity
As previously noted, DeFi relies heavily on smart contracts as well as stablecoins. There
have been a lot of news stories recently about hackers exploiting bugs in the code of these smart
contracts, but even flawless code can cause financial stability problems. 47 In moments of crisis,
“the elasticity of law has proved time and again critical for avoiding a complete financial
meltdown.” 48 Smart contracts, however, are designed to be as inflexible as possible, executing
their preprogrammed instructions without waiting for any further input from a court or even the
parties themselves.
When unexpected events occur, parties to regular financial contracts have the opportunity
to amend them or agree not to enforce them. Legal systems have also developed the ability to
relax and suspend contractual obligations in the face of a significant unanticipated event, whether
through the use of bankruptcy courts, encouraging a contractual party not to enforce their rights,
or even by enacting legislation that declares certain contractual terms illegal. 49 Because of their
reliance on smart contracts, DeFi transactions will execute quickly, and will be harder to stop or
undo (for example, DeFi loans are often structured so that they are automatically liquidated if there
is insufficient collateral posted). 50 The execution of a smart contract can only be paused, changed,
or undone with the consent of whoever controls the relevant distributed ledger, and where the
ledger is decentralized and permissionless (like the Ethereum ledger) there is no single individual
who can coordinate the process—even if the parties to the smart contract (as well as the public
interest) all support it. Instead, any pause, change or reversal of a smart contract will require the
consensus of all the nodes in the distributed ledger supporting the smart contract, which will take
time (after the DAO hack in 2016, it took over a month for the nodes of the Ethereum distributed
ledger to coordinate their response). 51 It seems highly unlikely that this kind of consensus could
ever be achieved before the smart contract executes, and so any intervention is likely to come too
late to prevent runs, fire sales, and other destabilizing harms.
While there are steps that can be taken to better equip a smart contract to adapt to
unexpected events (for example, a smart contract can be programmed to consult an external
oracle), taking these kinds of steps will increase transaction costs. The Ethereum ledger (which is
“the predominant blockchain on which DeFi protocols and applications function”) 52 charges a “gas
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cost” for any computing done, and consulting an oracle would increase the amount of computing
power (and thus the gas charge) necessary to execute a smart contract. Participants in the DeFi
markets will probably be willing to bear these charges up to a certain point, but eventually, these
ongoing operational costs will discourage measures that cater for very unusual events.
Unfortunately, when we’re talking about financial stability, low-probability high-consequence tail
events are the ones we’re most concerned about.
5. An illustration: AIG’s credit default swaps in the DeFi era
It can be hard to conceptualize DeFi’s implications for financial stability in the abstract. I
therefore offer an illustration here, by explaining what would have happened in 2007-8 if credit
default swaps issued by AIG had been issued as a form of DeFi. 53
In the lead-up to the 2018 financial crisis, the insurance giant AIG had issued an estimated
$1.8 trillion of credit default swaps (“CDS”) that would require it to make payments if the
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) underlying those CDS suffered some type of credit event.
AIG was not in a position to actually pay out on all of those CDS – at the time, AIG’s parent
company reported total capital of $95.8 billion – but AIG had assumed that the underlying MBS
would never default and that payments would never be required. However, as time progressed,
and the mortgages backing those MBS began to default in alarming numbers, people started to
admit the possibility that MBS themselves might default, which made AIG’s position riskier.
Worried that AIG might not be able to make payments on its CDS if the MBS failed, the banks
and other investors that had bought CDS from AIG turned to provisions in their contracts that
required AIG to provide them with collateral if the risks associated with MBS increased.
It was these calls for collateral that ultimately forced a government bailout – to the tune of
tens of billions of dollars – to prevent AIG from failing. In particular, the investment bank
Goldman Sachs demanded on several occasions that AIG post collateral in response to downgrades
of the MBS referenced in the CDS that AIG had issued to Goldman. Pursuant to the agreements
governing the arrangements between Goldman Sachs and AIG, these collateral calls were
authorized if Goldman Sachs believed that the value of the underlying MBS had decreased.
However, AIG had dismissed the possibility of such collateral calls – in fact, many senior people
at AIG were unaware that the contracts authorized these collateral calls at all – and so no one at
AIG had developed any way of assessing what the appropriate amount of collateral should be. As
a result, Goldman Sachs was largely in a position to dictate how much collateral it was entitled to
in a collateral call.
When Goldman Sachs did make its collateral call, AIG objected, the parties negotiated,
and they ultimately agreed that AIG could post much less collateral than Goldman Sachs had
initially demanded. However, if this had happened in an era of DeFi and the parties had used smart
contracts to automate the collateral call process, Goldman Sachs would simply have had to inform
This account of events relating to the credit default swaps that AIG issued to Goldman Sachs is drawn from Rena
S. Miller & Kathleen Ann Ruane, Congressional Research Service, R41398, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, DERIVATIVES (2012); and Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES,
265-274 (2011).
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a so-called “oracle” of the amount of desired collateral (remember that AIG didn’t negotiate for
any rights with respect to collateral calls). Upon consulting the oracle, the smart contract would
immediately have withdrawn stablecoins from AIG’s wallet on the distributed ledger and
transferred them to Goldman Sachs. There would have been much less scope for flexibility or
negotiation in Goldman Sachs’ treatment of AIG, and AIG’s solvency might have been in jeopardy
as early as 2007.
When AIG ultimately did reach the brink of failure in September 2008, again as a result of
collateral calls in connection with the many CDS it had issued, AIG’s insolvency was averted by
the government pledging to provide AIG with the funds necessary to cover those collateral calls.
If the relevant CDS provisions had been automated as smart contracts, though, would there have
been a way to suspend collateral calls until AIG received its infusion of government funds, or
would collateral (in the form of stablecoins) already have been transferred away form AIG,
rendering AIG insolvent before government aid could arrive? Parties to a paper contract can agree
among themselves not to enforce a contract when it is not in their best interests to do so, but there
is much less flexibility in a smart contract. Unless a smart contract were programed in advance to
delay execution following the announcement of a government bailout of a counterparty (an
unlikely event that would probably not have been contemplated at the time the smart contract was
programmed), such news would not prevent default – even though, in reality, the announcement
of government support succeeded in saving AIG in 2008.
6. A note on monetary policy
This testimony is primarily focused on the impact of stablecoins and DeFi on financial
stability. However, financial instability is not the only threat to broader economic growth. Central
banks like the Federal Reserve carry out monetary policy functions in order to match the supply
of money to the needs of the economy, and the rise of stablecoins has the potential to disrupt these
functions. For example, central banks manage the money supply to respond to inflation. When
there is a lot of money available in the economy, it is cheaper to borrow, and cheaper money
increases purchasing power which can drive up inflation. The converse is also true: when there is
less money available, inflation is reduced. If money increasingly takes the form of stablecoins
issued by private entities, then that could displace the use of fiat currencies and limit the ability of
central banks to match the money supply to the economic situation. Private sector institutions –
who have no mandate to serve the public interest – will have usurped control over the money
supply, undermining central banks’ ability to rein in inflation or address deflation. This is yet
another reason to avoid policies that encourage the growth of stablecoins.
Central banks are certainly concerned about the impact that widely-used stablecoins could
have on their monetary policy. As a result, many central banks are contemplating adopting central
bank digital currencies (“CBDCs”) to compete with privately-issued stablecoins, notwithstanding
that they have misgivings about the financial stability implications of CBDCs (particularly their
potential to encourage runs from bank deposits to CBDCs). 54 Given these financial stability
concerns (and also concerns about user privacy), if CBDCs are nothing more than a defensive
Bank for International Settlements, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES: FOUNDATIONAL
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response designed to outcompete the Diems of the world, that is another reason for Congress to
consider whether Diem should be permitted in the first place. The need to protect monetary policy
is also another justification for measures that prohibit regulated depository institutions from
issuing stablecoins: if significant volumes of transactions are consummated in JPMCoins, for
example, the Federal Reserve will also have lost some of its control of the money supply.
7. Possible Congressional approaches to stablecoins
Ban or licensing regime
Given stablecoins’ inherent fragility, limited utility outside of the DeFi ecosystem, and
potential to cannibalize monetary policy, Congress should consider whether banning stablecoins
is appropriate. If Congress does not wish to enact a full ban, it could also consider a licensing
regime for stablecoins whereby stablecoins will only be authorized if their issuers can demonstrate:
(i) that the stablecoins have a purpose that is connected to real-world economic growth (i.e. growth
outside of the DeFi ecosystem); (ii) that the issuers have the institutional capacity to manage the
risks associated with the stablecoin’s reserve and technology; (iii) that a run on the stablecoin
would not impact financial stability; and (iv) that the stablecoin does not pose a threat to U.S.
monetary policy. Although a ban or a licensing regime would need to be designed carefully to
limit regulatory arbitrage, it would not be impossible to implement. As this statement has explored,
stablecoins and DeFi are not as decentralized as advertised, and so there are intermediaries to
whom regulation could be applied.
When considering measures like a ban or a licensing regime, Congress will no doubt wish
to consider the impact of such measures on innovation. Innovation is important, but Congress
should think critically about the type of innovation it wants to encourage. It would be wrong to
assume that all crypto-related innovation is intended to make financial services more accessible to
underserved populations. Stablecoins and DeFi services are used predominantly by people who
already have access to the traditional banking system. If stablecoins and DeFi only provide
marginal improvements over the financial services that are already available, but end up making
our financial system more fragile, then chilling their development would be good public policy. It
is worth noting that a World Economic Forum White Paper recently concluded that stablecoins
currently offer limited benefits for financial inclusion:
The principal finding of this white paper is that stablecoins are subject to many of the same barriers
that constrain citizens from accessing other financial products and services, such as bank accounts,
mobile money accounts or fully digital remittance providers. Where stablecoins are accessible, they
generally address financial inclusion barriers to a similar degree as other digital financial
services…stablecoins as currently deployed would not provide compelling new benefits for financial
inclusion beyond those offered by pre-existing options. 55

If Congress wants to encourage financial inclusion, it could consider focusing on
supporting innovation in simpler mobile payments and remittance technologies, which might
satisfy consumers’ needs without the complications of runnable stablecoins, or distributed ledgers
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with convoluted governance structures. Simpler technologies would also avoid the environmental
costs of crypto mining.
More limited interventions
A ban or licensing regime would respond to all of the financial stability risks identified in
this statement (including the risk of runs on stablecoins), as well as responding to concerns about
monetary policy. More limited interventions would inevitably entail tradeoffs. I have advocated
against bringing stablecoins within the perimeter of banking regulation, which means that
stablecoins will remain more fragile than they would be if regulated more like bank deposits. To
limit the fallout of any run on a stablecoin, measures will therefore need to be considered to: (i)
limit investors’ expectations about the stability of stablecoins; (ii) monitor changes in the usage of
stablecoins; (iii) prevent large tech firms and regulated depository institutions from issuing
stablecoins; and (iv) prevent regulated depository institutions from accepting deposits from
stablecoin issuers.
I will set out here some suggestions for measures that can be taken to address these
objectives, and other objectives identified in my testimony.
•

•

The SEC and CFTC should continue to oversee the stablecoins under their jurisdiction to
ensure that investors are protected. More specifically:
o The SEC and CFTC should prevent stablecoin issuers from misrepresenting that
stablecoins are more stable than they are (for example, enforcement actions would
be appropriate against stablecoins that claim they are covered by FDIC insurance).
o The SEC and CFTC should compel disclosure of the contents of the reserves
backing any stablecoin under their jurisdiction.
 While various crypto industry members have asked that Congress create a
dedicated crypto regulator, doing so would be problematic for many
reasons, including that:
 The US already has too many financial regulators, which leads both
to duplicative regulatory efforts and issues falling through
regulatory gaps. Adding another regulator would exacerbate this
issue.
 The more specialized the regulator, the more opportunities there are
for the industry to “capture” the regulator. Concerns about captured
regulators were an important impetus for the abolition of the Office
of Thrift Supervision in 2010, and would be a real concern with a
dedicated crypto regulator.
The Office of Financial Research (“OFR”) and the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”) should be charged with monitoring the growth of stablecoins. If a stablecoin
becomes a widely-used and accepted payment service, the FSOC should consider:
o Designating the stablecoin issuer as a systemically important financial institution,
utilizing the designation power bestowed by Section 113 of Dodd-Frank. This
would subject the issuer to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
o If the stablecoin is decentralized, it may be more appropriate for the FSOC to use
its authority under Section 804 of Dodd-Frank to designate the associated payment
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•

•

•

service as systemically important, and therefore subject to supervision by the
Federal Reserve.
Steps should be taken to prevent large tech firms like Meta/Facebook from issuing
stablecoins:
o The FSOC should explore how its designation power under Section 113 of DoddFrank could be applied to a large tech firm. The possibility of designation (and
subsequent regulation by the Federal Reserve) may be enough to discourage
Meta/Facebook from pursuing its Diem stablecoin.
 A tech firm’s size and the availability of substitutes for its stablecoins would
obviously be relevant to determining its systemic importance, but the FSOC
should also take into account the size of the firm’s network, the breadth of
the firm’s non-financial services, and the firm’s unique access to certain
kinds of data.
o Antitrust regulators should consider prohibiting a large tech firm from leveraging
its network (as developed in a market where it has monopoly or near-monopoly
power) into a payments platform.
o Congress should consider amending existing legislation that prevents commercial
firms from accepting deposits to prohibit such commercial firms from accepting
deposits and offering payments services.
Regulators of insured depository institutions and their holding companies should issue
rules (or at the very least, guidance) designating the following practices as unsafe and
unsound:
o Holding stablecoin reserves in a deposit account.
o Investing in any crypto asset.
Insured depository institutions should be prohibited from issuing their own stablecoins.
This could be achieved by legislation amending national banks’ powers as specified in 12
USC Section 24 (seventh) (equivalent amendments would need to be made to the powers
of state-chartered banks as well). Alternatively, banking regulators could effect this
prohibition through a joint rulemaking.
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